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Respondent, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") submits its 
Respondent's/Cross-Appellant's Brief as follows: 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellants, Hagadone Corp. and Royal Indemnity Co. (collectively "Royal"), 
appeals the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and 
Recommendation, entered on May 14, 2007 (CR, pp. 191-203), and Order, also entered 
on May 14, 2007. (CR, pp. 204-205). Appellants' primary contention is that the 
Commission erred in determining that it had failed to prove ISIF's liability for any 
proportionate share of Claimant's total and permanent disability. ISIF also cross-
appeal's the Commission's May 14, 2007 Findings, Conclusion, Recommendation and 
corresponding Order on the basis that the Commission erred in failing to rule that Royal 
was collaterally estopped from asserting liability against ISIF for a proportionate share 
of the Claimant's total and permanent disability due to the Industrial Commission's 
ruling in the first proceeding, in which Royal was found liable for all Claimant's total and 
permanent disability benefits. 
Claimant Robert Stoddard, who was employed by Hagadone, asserted a 
worker's compensation complaint, alleging the entitlement to disability benefits as a 
result of a May 5, 1996 industrial accident. (CR, p. 1). Stoddard also filed a second 
worker's compensation complaint with regard to an accident which allegedly occurred 
on October 10, 1997. (CR, p. 4). A third complaint was later filed based on an alleged 
industrial accident which occurred on May 11, 1999. (CR, p. 20). On May 19, 2000, 
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these three complaints were consolidated. (CR, p. 30). There is no dispute that Mr. 
Stoddard was 63 years of age at the time of his last accident. (CR, p. 185). 
· While the face of the three complaints does not reveal that Mr. Stoddard was 
initially alleging total and permanent disability as a result of the industrial accidents, it is 
clear that Royal became aware, at some point during the pendancy of the proceedings, 
that Stoddard was claiming total and permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine and 
that one of the issues to be determined at hearing was how total and permanent 
disability should be apportioned. See Appx., Exh A (Notice of Hearing, dated 7/24/00); · 
Exh. B (portions of the transcript of the 3/14/01 hearing in front of Referee Michael E. 
Powers); Exh. C (Hagadone's Post-Hearing Brief). 
After conducting a hearing on March 14, 2001, in which evidence was presented 
before a referee for the Commission, on September 7, 2001, the Commission entered 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. (CR, pp. 33-62). The 
Commission concluded that Stoddard was permanently and totally disabled pursuant to 
the Odd-lot doctrine. (CR, p. 61 ). General was determined to be liable for 20% of 
Stoddard's permanent and total disability award, while Royal was assigned 60% of that 
liability. Id. 
Stoddard, concerned as to why only 80% of his permanent and total disability 
award was assigned by the Commission, filed a Motion for Payment Under Idaho Code 
§72-313, Alternative Motion for Clarification (Reconsideration). (CR, pp. 104-113). 
Royal also filed its own Motion for Reconsideration. (CR, pp. 117-118). In its 
Memorandum, Royal noted that it was not challenging the Commission's finding that the 
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the Odd-lot doctrine. Rather, the 
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Commission was asked to reconsider the apportionment of the award. (CR, p. 125). 
General filed its own Motion for Reconsideration, whereby it asked that its proportion of 
liability be re-evaluated and for the Commission to clarify its prior order. (CR, p. 129). 
On December 14, 2001, the Industrial Commission issued its Order Regarding 
Reconsideration. (CR, pp. 171-177). In that Order, the Commission expressed its 
frustration in attempting to proportion the full amount of Stoddard's total and permanent 
disability award between the two sureties, as cases in which a worker with a permanent 
impairment who incurs a subsequent disability rendering the worker totally and 
permanently disabled usually involve the payment of lifetime benefits by ISIF. (CR, pp. 
172-173). However, the sureties never joined ISIF in Stoddard's proceeding. (CR, p. 
173). The Commission determined that the last accident caused Stoddard to suffer total 
and permanent disability and that, in light of the fact that were no other facts or 
circumstances presented to the Commission upon which to guide the apportionment 
analysis, Royal was assigned full liability for Stoddard's total and permanent disability 
benefits. (CR, p. 174). No appeal was taken to this Court. 
On May 20, 2002, Royal filed its complaint against ISIF, claiming that ISIF was 
liable for Stoddard's total and permanent disability benefits. (CR, p. 184). ISIF 
answered the complaint on June 4, 2002. (CR, p. 188). On October 7, 2002, ISIF filed 
its Petition for Declaratory Ruling. See Appx., Exh. D. In its Petition, ISIF argued that 
Royal's claims should be dismissed through application of the doctrine of waiver and/or 
collateral estoppel. Further, ISIF contended that the Commission's December 14, 2001 
Order barred Royal's complaint pursuant to I.C. § 72-718 and that its due process rights 
would be denied if Royal was allowed to proceed against the ISIF. Finally, ISIF argued 
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that Royal would be unable to establish the requisite elements under I.C. § 72-332 for 
ISIF liability. Ultimately, ISIF's primary contention for dismissal of the complaint was the 
allegation that Royal had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of Stoddard's 
right to receive total and permanent disability benefits, was clearly determined to be fully 
liable for the payment of those benefits and failed to join ISIF in that proceeding to seek 
a determination whether ISIF should be liable for a portion of Stoddard's benefits. See 
Appx., Exh. E, F (ISIF's briefing in support of its Motion for Declaratory Ruling). 
On August 27, 2003, the Commission issued a Declaratory Ruling. See Appx., 
Exh. G. In that Ruling, the Commission once again noted that, in the underlying 
proceeding, it had found Stoddard permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd-
lot doctrine and declared Royal liable for the benefits. Id., p. 5. However, the 
Commission did not believe the application of collateral estoppel was relevant in this 
case because the issues previously disputed between Stoddard and Royal were not the 
same as the potential issues that would be litigated between ISIF and Royal. Id., p. 6. 
The Commission noted that there are different standards for liability against ISIF for 
total and permanent disability than there are when assessing liability against the 
employer/surety. Id., p. 7. 
Although the Commission admitted that the result of allowing Royal's suit against 
ISIF to go forward may require re-litigation of the issue of total permanent disability, it 
believed that collateral estoppel did not operate to bar the claim because ISIF's liability 
under I.C. § 72-332 had not been litigated in the prior proceeding. Id., p. 7-8. The 
Commission also found that there was no direct evidence that Royal intentionally 
relinquished its right to pursue ISi F liability simply by not joining them in the previous 
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case, that I.C. §72-718 did not serve to bar Royal's suit against ISIF and that any of 
ISIF's due process concerns would be addressed by giving it a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard when determining its liability under I.C. § 72-332. Id., pp. 9-11. 
The case between Royal and IS.IF proceeded to hearing on July 19, 2006. On 
May 14, 2007, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and 
Recommendation. (CR, pp. 191-203). In that decision, the Commission noted ISIF's 
continuing objection that the prior proceeding between Stoddard and Royal barred the 
re-litigation of the issue of the apportionment of liability for Stoddard's total and 
permanent disability payments since Royal had been previously found liable for the full 
amount of that award. (CR, p. 199). However, the Commission once again stated that. 
ISIF was not a party to the first hearing and, therefore, that a traditional apportionment 
analysis under I.C. § 72-332 had never been completed until this time. (CR, p. 200). 
The Commission found that its ruling in the previous proceeding was specifically framed 
in the context of the particular issues presented by Stoddard and Royal to the 
Commission. Id. 
While once again rejecting ISIF's collateral estoppel argument, the Commission 
did find that Royal had failed to prove a "combination" under the "but for" test under I.C. 
§72-332 with regard to the facts of this case. (CR, p. 200). The Commission found that 
Stoddard was unemployable after his May 11, 1999 accident and injury and, therefore, 
that the inquiry with regard to ISIF liability was whether Stoddard's pre-existing physical 
impairments combined with the last accident to render him totally and permanently 
disabled. (CR, p. 201 ). The Commission stated that the relevant inquiry was 
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Stoddard's status of disability at the time of the second hearing wherein ISIF was 
"allowed" to participate. (CR, p. 202). Ultimately, the Commission found: 
At that time, Claimant was 70 years of age and was still totally and 
permanently disabled. However, Mr. Brownell testified, and Mr. Crum did 
not disagree, that when considering only Claimant's age and lack of 
transferable skills to the sedentary labor market, Claimant was totally and 
permanently disabled. It was Claimant's last industrial accident, for which 
ISIF bears no responsibility, that landed him in the sedentary labor market. 
ISIF's argument that based on these facts, there has been no showing 
that any of Claimant's pre-existing impairments combined with his last 
industrial accident to render him totally and permanently disabled so as to 
invoke liability is persuasive .... Royal has failed to prove ISIF's liability for 
any proportionate share of Claimant's total and permanent disability. 
(CR, p. 202). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Industrial Commission commit error in failing to dismiss Royal's 
Complaint against ISIF on the basis of collateral estoppel, wavier and/or the application 
of 1.C. § 72-718? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission correctly base its determination of 
Claimant's status of disability at the time of the second Industrial Commission hearing 
on July 18, 2006? 
111. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court will uphold the 
findings of the Commission if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence 
in the record. /.C. § 72-732; Lethrud v. State, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 
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1070 (1995). Evidence is "substantial and competent" if a reasonable mind might 
accept such evidence as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion. Reiher v. 
American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994). In reviewing a 
decision from the Commission, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton 
Logging, 118 Idaho 150,155,795 P.2d 312,317 (1990). However, the Commission's 
conclusions of law are freely reviewed by the Court. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Davaz v. 
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. #84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 
P.3d 655, 658 (2006). Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation 
of issues adjudicated in prior litigation between the parties is likewise a question of law 
subject to free review. Smith v. U.S.R. V. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 798, 118 
P.3d 127, 131 (2005). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Argument on Cross-Appeal: The Application of Collateral Estoppel, I.C. § 
72-718 and Waiver 
It is undisputed that Royal was aware, at least as early as July 21, 2000 (the date 
of the Notice of Hearing), that Stoddard was claiming entitlement to an award for total 
and permanent disability. This was almost nine months before the actual hearing to 
determine Stoddard's entitlement to benefits. However, Royal chose not add ISIF as a 
party to have it included in the apportionment of any total and permanent disability 
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award. Subsequently, the issue of Stoddard's status as totally and permanently 
disabled was clearly litigated during the March 14, 2001 hearing. See Appx., Exh. B. 
In its Order Regarding Consideration, the Commission conclusively decided the 
issues surrounding Stoddard's claim for total and permanent disability. The 
Commission found that "Claimant experienced four accidents that eventually rendered 
Claimant totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine." (CR, p. 173). 
Further, the Commission found: 
[u]nder the facts of this case, the Commission has determined that the last 
accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. No 
other facts or circumstances have been presented to the -Commission. 
Accordingly, the Commission finds that Royal should be fully liable for total 
and permanent disability benefits. 
(CR, p. 174). Royal, having been adjudicated solely liable for Stoddard's lifetime total 
and permanent disability income benefits, did not appeal to this Court. Rather, the 
Commission's ruling became a final judgment, binding on Royal. 
However, the Commission continues to maintain that Royal was entitled to assert 
a collateral proceeding against ISIF whereby Royal could once again litigate Claimant's 
disability status (even if such a process would not directly affect Claimant's benefits), 
and apportionment of liability for Stoddard's total and permanent disability payments. 
As explained in more detail below, the Commission's decision in this regard was 
erroneous and not consistent with the dictates of Idaho Law. 
1. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel 
"Res judicata" is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppal). "Under the principles of claim preclusion, a valid final 
judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar 
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to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim." Hindmarsh v. 
Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent 
action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims "relating to the 
same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue preclusion protects 
litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Rodriguez v. 
Dep't of Corr., 136 ldaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). 
Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue 
preclusion applies. See D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605 
(2000). Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of 
an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier 
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the 
earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually 
decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior 
litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the litigation. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 63, 157 P.3d 
613, 618 (2007). 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the 
acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would 
follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the 
public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and 
(3) it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
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Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 
257,668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
In support of its argument for the application of collateral estoppel in the 
proceeding initiated by Royal, ISIF cited the case of Jackman v. Industrial Special 
tndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 689,931 P.2d.1207 (1997). In Jackman, the claimant settled 
his claims against the employer/surety pursuant to a lump sum agreement, which the 
Commission approved, discharging the employer/surety of all liability relating to 
claimant's accident. Then, claimant filed an application requesting a hearing for 
compensation and award against the ISIF, which was not a party to the first proceeding. 
Id., at 690. The claimant contended that, in his previous case against the 
employer/surety, he was not given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of 
apportionment pursuant to J.C. § 72-332. Id., at 691. The Court rejected this argument, 
noting: 
Jackman's present claim against ISIF for apportionment is tied to 
the same impairment rating Jackman relied upon in his claim against 
[employer/surety]: 33% whole person impairment. Jackman had a fair 
opportunity and incentive to vigorously litigate his whole person 
impairment rating in Jackman's case against [employer/surety]. 
Jackman argues the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be 
applied in this case since the issue in the present case is distinguishable 
from the issue raised in Jackman's action against [employer/surety). 
Jackman contends that the issue in Jackman's case against SIF 
was the total value of Jackman's claim against SIF and that the 
apportioning of benefits between ISIF and SIF was never addressed in the 
Agreement. ... 
. . . Jackman cannot rely upon the same percentage impairment 
rating in order to attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present 
additional evidence of impairment in order to increase his impairment 
rating. The issue presented in the proceeding against 
[employer/surety), compensating Jackman for his impairment rating 
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of 33% whole person, is identical to the issue Jackman presently 
raises: whether ISIF must compensate Jackman for a portion of the 
same 33% whole person impairment. 
In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, there must 
be final judgment on the merits. On February 20, 1990, the commission 
approved the Agreement, including the 33% whole person impairment 
rating, pursuant to I.C. Section 72-404 .... The Commission's February 
20, 1990 order, approving the Agreement pursuant to I.C. Section 72-404, 
was a final judgment on the merits. 
Despite the fact that ISIF was not a party to Jackman's 
Agreement with [employer/surety], ISIF may still assert the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel in the present case. Jackman was a party to 
the prior action against [employer/surety] and is the party against 
whom the plea of collateral estoppel has been asserted . ... (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Id. at 691-692. 
Jackman attempted to avoid the application of collateral estoppel by framing the 
issue being litigated so narrowly that the Court would have a basis to find that it was not 
identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding. Jackman argued that his action 
against ISIF was not barred because the issue of apportionment to ISIF was not 
litigated or decided in the earlier suit (even though a full determination of his entitlement 
to benefits was clearly litigated and decided). This Court was not persuaded by the 
argument, as the larger issue of the extent of the claimant's injuries and the parties 
responsible for the payment of benefits under the worker's compensation act had clearly 
been previously decided. 
In its Declaratory Ruling, the Commission dismissed the significance of the 
Jackman decision, noting that the decision in that case was motivated primarily by a 
fear of double recovery, a factor which is not significant here. See Appx., Exh. G, p. 7-
8. However, the issue of preventing potential double recovery is but only one of the 
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goals of res judicata. As noted above, the doctrine also seeks to prevent inconsistent 
results, repetitious litigation and to protect finality of result. This Court in Jackman was 
asserting that the claimant had his day in court, had the opportunity to litigate the issues 
with respect to liability for his worker's compensation injury and was attempting to once 
again assert the issue of apportionment and liability for his claims in a collateral 
proceeding. 
In this case, although both Royal and the Commission tried to frame the issue to 
avoid the application of collateral estoppel, Royal has attempted to litigate the same 
issues which were fully and fairly litigated, as well as actually decided, in an earlier 
proceeding - whether Stoddard is totally and permanently disabled and what party 
bears the liability for the apportionment of the total and permanent disability benefits. 
Under I.C. §72-332, Royal had the burden in this proceeding to demonstrate that 
Stoddard's permanent pre-existing physical impairments "combined with" his 
compensable industrial injury so as to result in total and permanent disability. See 
Eckhart v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 133 Idaho 260, 985 P.2d 685 (1999); 
Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 29 Idaho 76, 921 P.2d 1200 
(1996). 
Thus, in order for liability against ISIF to be recognized in this case, Royal had to 
prove that "but for" Stoddard's permanent pre-existing physical impairments, he would 
not be totally and permanently disabled. Likewise, Royal had to show that "but for" 
Stoddard's industrial injury in 1999, he would not be totally and permanently disabled. 
However, in this case, it is clear that the issue of "combination" had been fully and finally 
resolved in the earlier proceeding. The Commission in its December 14, 2001 Order 
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found that it was the last accident that caused Stoddard to suffer total and permanent 
disability and that Royal was liable for all of Stoddard's total and permanent disability 
payments. (CR, p. 171 ). Both of these findings should have precluded Royal from 
arguing in a collateral proceeding that it was actually Stoddard's pre-existing impairment 
"combined with" his last accident which rendered him totally and permanently disabled. 
Such an argument is clearly at odds with the Commission's earlier decision. 
The Commission, in its May 14, 2007 Findings/Conclusion/Recommendation, 
tried to once again address ISIF's concerns regarding the application of collateral 
estoppel. (CR, p. 200). In once again dismissing the argument, the Commission noted 
that ISIF was not a party in the original proceeding, preventing a traditional 
apportionment analysis under /.C. §72-332 from taking place. Thus, the Commission 
ruled that Royal was able to litigate apportionment under that statute in a collateral 
proceeding against ISIF. Respondent believes this ruling is tantamount to putting the 
cart before the horse. 
It should be once again noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed 
to avoid the re-litigation of issues already decided, where the party had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue. See, e.g., Magic Valley Radiology, P.A., v. Ko/ouch, 
123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993). ISIF respectfully asserts that the Commission 
confused what Royal actually chose to litigate in the underlying proceeding with what it 
had the opportunity to litigate. There is no dispute that Royal had its chance to argue 
that Stoddard's pre-existing conditions combined with his last accident as the cause of 
his total and permanent disability and to join ISIF to seek apportionment of total and 
permanent disability benefits. However, Royal, for whatever reason, chose not to take 
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that course of action. Thus, the Commission found that the last accident was the cause 
of the total disability and Royal bore the full burden of paying for those benefits. 
ISIF would also emphasize that Royal was not prejudiced by this determination. 
It had made the strategic decision not to join ISIF in the original proceeding and to avoid 
a traditional apportionment analysis under I.C. § 72-332. However, ISIF was clearly 
prejudiced by the Commission's decision to allow Royal to assert a collateral suit 
against it. Stoddard had already been determined to be totally and permanently 
disabled in the prior proceeding. Thus, the parties faced one of two courses in the 
current proceeding: either ISIF would have no opportunity to contest Stoddard's status 
as totally and permanently disabled in the collateral proceeding (as the issue was earlier 
fully and finally decided),. or the Commission would have to allow ISIF to contest the 
issue of total and permanent disability and potentially find itself making an inconsistent 
ruling on the same issue. 
The first option clearly would have violated ISIF's due process rights in this 
proceeding and the second result is clearly in violation of the precepts of collateral 
estoppel. The Commission noted that a different analysis of liability may have been 
utilized in the initial proceeding had ISIF been a party at that time. (CR, p. 200). 
Further, it is clear, based upon a review of the record, that the Commission struggled to 
correctly apportion benefits for total and permanent disability in the initial proceeding 
since no one had added ISIF as a party. However, ISIF should not have had to bear the 
time, expense and resources for Royal's failure to make use of the opportunity to 
conduct a traditional apportionment analysis under I.C. § 72-332 in the original 
proceeding. Thus, Royal was determined to be solely liable for Stoddard's total and 
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permanent disability benefits and should have been collaterally estopped from litigating 
what both was and should have been litigated in the prior proceeding. 
2. Application of I.C. § 72-718 
Another issue which has basically been ignored by both Royal and the 
Commission in these proceedings is the application of I.C. § 72-718 in the analysis of 
whether Royal was lawfully entitled to assert this action against ISIF. /.C. § 72-718 
states, in pertinent part that, "[a] decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, 
shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing 
the decision in the office of the commission ... " Thus, the Commission's September 7, 
2001 Findings and Conclusions, along with its December 14, 2001 Order, were final and 
conclusive as to all the matters adjudicated therein. Once again, Royal failed to appeal 
either of those two decisions. 
The Commission clearly adjudicated whether Stoddard was totally and 
permanently disabled in the prior proceeding. Indeed, Royal submitted evidence in the 
attempt to rebut Stoddard's total and permanent disability contentions. While Royal was 
found to be solely liable for Stoddard's total and permanent disability benefits, it has 
sought apportionment of Stoddard's disability benefit award in this proceeding. In other 
words, Royal utilized this proceeding to seek relief of a portion of its responsibility 
regarding Stoddard's benefits - a responsibility the Commission had already decided 
belonged solely with Royal. 
Further, the Commission had already decided that it was the last accident which 
caused Stoddard to suffer total and permanent disability. However, Royals contentions 
in this proceeding, if successful, would require the Commission to reach a conclusion in 
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clear contravention of its early award. A review of the factual and procedural history of 
this case demonstrates that the Commission's prior decision in this case should have 
operated to bar Royal's suit against ISIF. See also Whittaker v. Cecil, 69 S.W.3d 69 
(Ky. 2002) (Compensation Board's final award and employer's failure to raise 
apportionment argument against special fund on reconsideration or on appeal barred 
the employer's subsequent action against the special fund). 
3. Application of Waiver 
It has already been established that Royal was aware that the issue with respect 
to Stoddard's claim for total and permanent disability benefits was being litigated in the 
prior proceeding. Indeed, Royal fully contested the issue. It is also undisputed that 
Royal had a full and fair opportunity to join ISIF in the proceeding so as to seek 
apportionment for any total and permanent disability benefits to which the Commission 
found Stoddard was entitled. However, Royal chose not to pursue such a course. This 
action clearly implicates the doctrine of waiver. 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Brand 5 Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,734,639 P.2d 432 (1981). "It is a voluntary act 
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some 
right or advantage which fthe party] might at fthe party's] option have demanded and 
insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956). "Waiver 
arising out of conduct is in the nature of estoppel." Idaho Bank of Commerce v. 
Chastain, 86 Idaho 146, 383 P.2d 849 (1963). It is an equitable doctrine based upon 
fairness and justice and, in order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly 
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appear, although it may be established by conduct. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Miriing Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
The concept of waiver is grounded in the clear intention of a party to relinquish a 
right that it holds. Royal clearly had a right to add ISIF to the underlying suit and argue 
for apportionment under /.C. § 72-332. Royal's decision not to do so, even if perplexing, 
constitutes a clear waiver. Certainly, the issues of permanent disability and 
apportionment should not have been re-litigated when Royal made an election to waive 
its right to seek apportionment from ISIF in the prior suit. Under these facts, the 
Commission should have concluded that Royal waived its right to seek apportionment 
from ISIF in this proceeding. 
B. Argument on Royal's Appeal: When should a Claimant's Disability Status 
be Analyzed? 
ISIF's other argument presented to the Commission in Royal's suit was the 
contention that Royal had failed to prove a "combination" under the "but for" test (/.C. § 
72-332) under the facts of this case. In the Commission's May 14, 2007 Findings, it 
was noted that the existence of several pre-existing permanent physical impairments 
were determined in the earlier proceeding. (CR, p. 201). Further, the Commission 
noted the undisputed fact that Stoddard was unemployable after his May 11, 1999 
accident and injury. Thus, in this proceeding the operative question became whether 
Stoddard's pre-existing physical impairments combined with the last accident to render 
him totally and permanently disabled· or, stated in another manner, whether Stoddard 
would have been totally and permanently disabled but for his last accident. 
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Logically, ISIF does not bear the liability for the payment of total and permanent 
disability benefits where other factors may combine with an industrial accident to render 
a claimant totally and permanently disabled. Thus, the question becomes the operative 
point in time in which any "other factors" (besides the pre-existing impairment and fact 
of the last industrial injury) may be judged for purposes of determining their effect in 
causing the claimant's total and permanent disability. 
In this case, the Commission noted that Stoddard was able to work, albeit with 
restrictions and accommodation, prior to his last accident. (CR, p. 202). The Findings 
also state that Stoddard was not able to work after his last accident, that his employer 
was unable to further accommodate him after the last accident and that Stoddard's 
legitimate attempts to locate work had failed. There was also testimony that the last 
accident resulted in significant physical limitations which placed him in the sedentary 
work category. 
However, the Commission noted that the relevant inquiry in this case was 
Stoddard's disability status at the time of the second hearing wherein ISIF was allowed 
to participate. At that time, Stoddard was 70 years of age and was still totally and 
permanently disabled. (CR, p. 202). Thus, the Commission analyzed whether other 
factors, such as Stoddard's age, rendered him totally and permanently disabled. The 
Commission noted testimony from the hearing which supported the conclusion that, 
when considering only Stoddard's age and lack of transferable skills to the sedentary 
labor marker, Stoddard was totally and permanently disabled. Id. Further, the 
Commission ruled that it was Stoddard's last industrial accident, for which ISIF bore no 
responsibility, which placed Stoddard in the sedentary labor market. Thus, the 
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Commission found, there had been no showing that any of Stoddard's pre-existing 
impairments combined with his last industrial accident to render him totally and 
permanently disabled. Id. 
Royal's main contention of error on appeal is that the Commission was obligated 
by law to judge Stoddard's disability status, for purposes of adjudicating ISIF's liability 
for apportionment of benefits, at the time of his last industrial injury in May 1999, rather 
than the time of hearing in this matter: Royal asserts that if the Commission had utilized 
the 1999 date for analyzing disability and followed its own analysis in its 2001 decision, 
it should have been able to determine that the last industrial accident combined with 
Stoddard's pre-existing permanent impairments to render him totally and permanently 
disabled. 
1. The Industrial Commission Utilized the Correct Date of the Second 
Hearing in this Case as the Time at Which to Assess ISIF's Liability. 
The sole legal authority Royal cites in support of its contention that the 
Commission utilized the incorrect time period for the assessment of Stoddard's status of 
disability is Colpaert v. Larsons, Inc., 115 Idaho 825, 771 P.2d 46 (1989). Royal 
asserts that Colpaert stands for the proposition that the appropriate time to determine 
whether ISIF bears responsibility for the payment of benefits under I.C. § 72-332 is at 
the time of the last industrial accident. However, a review of the decision clearly 
demonstrates that Royal has misinterpreted the case. 
The issue in Colpaert was · whether the Commission had erred in its 
determination that the claimant had suffered from a permanent physical impairment 
which was "manifest" prior to her accident of December 12, 1982. Id. at 828. 
Obviously, this was a key issue in the proceeding, as ISIF liability only arises upon a 
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finding that there was, in fact, a manifest permanent, pre-existing physical impairment 
which combined with the last industrial accident to render the claimant permanently and 
totally disabled. In Colpaert, there was a dispute as to when the claimant's permanent 
physical impairment was manifest, i.e., whether it pre-existed the latest industrial 
accident. 
The Court noted that the rating of the permanent physical impairment (to 
determine whether it pre-existed the last industrial accident) is made at a point in time 
just prior to a claimant's industrial accident or injury. Id., at 829. In other words, the 
time. for determining whether the claimant suffered from a pre-existing permanent 
physical impairment is at the time of the last industrial accident. The Colpaert decision 
made no comment whatsoever as to the date at which a claimant's disability is judged 
for purposes of ISIF liability. 
However, the statutory scheme for determining the circumstances under which 
ISIF is liable for a share of a claimant's total and permanent disability award clearly 
establishes that the date for determining a claimant's disability status is the time of the 
actual hearing determining ISIF's liability. In any analysis of a worker's claim to 
permanent disability, the Commission first looks to Idaho Code § 72-423, which 
requires an analysis of whether a claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity is 
reduced or absent "and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be 
reasonably expected." Under Idaho Code§ 72-423, a permanent disability necessarily 
contains a temporal component in that the statute refers to a condition wherein no 
fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. 
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A permanent disability evaluation is also required under Idaho Code § 72-425. 
That statute mandates an appraisal of the Claimant's "present and probable future 
ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor permanent 
impairment and by pertinent non-medical factors as provided in§ 72-430, Idaho Code." 
Under Idaho Code § 72-430, the Commission is required to consider age when making 
a disability determination. 
Thus, in evaluating a claimant's permanent disability, the Industrial Commission 
is to render "an appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to 
engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment 
and by pertinent non-medical factors, as provided in Section 72-430." Idaho Code § 
72-425. 
ISIF contends that the statutory reference to "present" ability to engage in gainful 
activity necessarily refers to the date of hearing. There is no other "present" opportunity 
for the Commission to review the evidence, to assess the Claimant's medical condition, 
and to make an appraisal of his "present" ability to work. Likewise, the reference to 
"probable future ability" is necessarily a reference to the time period following the date 
of hearing. Therefore, it is the claimant's permanent disability as of the date of hearing 
which must be evaluated by the Industrial Commission in any case involving ISIF. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Idaho Code § 72-430 requires the 
Commission to consider other factors in its disability determination, including the 
claimant's age and diminished ability to compete in the labor market, considering all the 
personal and economic circumstances of the employee. Obviously, these factors are 
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not always the stagnant from the time of the last industrial accident and the time of the 
hearing. 
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is not a substitute for a pension or 
retirement account and does not serve as a general casualty insurance policy. As 
noted above, ISIF liability is implicated only where a pre-existing permanent physical 
impairment combines with a later industrial accident to render a claimant totally and 
permanently disabled. If the claimant suffers from a brain tumor or becomes severely 
injured in a car accident after the latest industrial accident and prior to the hearing, there 
would be a reasonable basis for finding that the affects of the brain tumor or car 
accident, alone, render the claimant totally and permanently disabled, regardless of a 
pre-existing permanent physical impairment. 
In other words, the purposes of the worker's compensation system are served by 
judging the claimant's disability status at the time of the hearing where ISIF's liability is 
to be determined. Only at that time can the Commission truly judge whether the "but 
for" test has been satisfied or whether other medical or non-medical factors have 
contributed to or caused the claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. Indeed, 
this is why this Court has previously stated that "the time of the hearing is the crucial 
point at which a claimant's permanent disability is to be permanently settled." Davaz v. 
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). 
In this case, the Commission properly determined Stoddard's disability status 
(including the reasons for his disability) at the time of the hearing in which ISIF was a 
party. In conducting its analysis, the Commission found that Stoddard's disability was 
not "but for" both his pre-existing physical impairments and his industrial injuries. 
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Rather, the Commission was entitled to look at Stoddard's advanced age and lack of 
transferable skills to the sedentary labor market following the termination of 
employment. Indeed, the Commission was obligated, under Idaho Code § 72-425, to 
give legal effect to these factors and was fully within the bounds of the law to determine 
whether these factors, without regard to other factors such as a pre-existing permanent 
physical impairment, combined with the last industrial accident, actually rendered 
Stoddard totally and permanently disabled. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Industrial Commission's previous orders finding that the last 
accident caused Stoddard to suffer total and permanent disability and that Royal was 
fully liable for the payment of Stoddard's disability benefits serves to collaterally estop 
Royal from seeking a reconsideration of those issues in the current proceeding against 
ISIF. Further, the application of I.C. § 72-718 demands that the Commission's 
September 7, 2001 Findings/Conclusions, along with its December 14, 2001 Order, 
were final and conclusive in determining Stoddard's disability status and liability for 
disability payments. Royal's proceeding against ISIF is an unlawful attempt to re-open 
those judgments. Moreover, Royal had the full and fair opportunity to add ISIF as a 
defendant in the underlying proceeding involving the Claimant, in order to seek 
apportionment of any total and permanent disability benefits, and clearly chose not to do 
so. These actions indisputably constitute a voluntary and intentional waiver on the part 
of Royal to seek apportionment against ISIF in this proceeding. On these bases, the 
portions of the Industrial Commission's May 14, 2007 
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Findings/Conclusion/Recommendation and corresponding Order with regard to ISIF's 
contentions regarding the application of collateral estoppel, waiver and I.C. § 72-718 
should be reversed and Royal's suit against ISIF seeking apportionment of Stoddard's 
total and permanent disability benefits should be dismissed. 
Finally, there is no merit to Royal's contention that the Industrial Commission 
utilized the incorrect date in judging Stoddard's status of disability. Both Idaho statutory 
and appellate case law clearly establishes that the time of the hearing where ISIF is a 
party is the crucial point at which a claimant's permanent disability is to be permanently 
settled. Therefore, the portion of the Industrial Commission's May 14, 2007 decision 
dismissing Royal's suit against ISIF upon the finding that ISIF had failed to prove that 
Stoddard's pre-existing impairments combined with his last industrial accident to render 
him totally and permanently disabled should be upheld. 
~ 
DATED this~ay of January 2008. 
By z:: / f&t~ 
/ Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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ERIC S. BAILEY 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
KENNETH L. MALLEA 
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MERIDIAN, ID 83680 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROBERT J. STODDARD, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) IC 96-018310 
) 97-036904 
V. ) 99-016897 
) 





GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY ) FILED 
OF AMERICA, Surety, ) 
JUL 2 4 2000 ) 
and ) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
) 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
JANUARY 25, 2001, at 9:30 a.m., for one full day, in the Industrial Commission field office, 1221 
Ironwood Drive, Suite 100, City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, on the 
following issues: 
1. Whether Claimant suffered personal injuries arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's injuries were the result of accidents arising out of and in the 
course of employment; 
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3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care, and the extent 
thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI), and the extent 
thereof; 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial or permanent total disability 
(PPD/PTD) in excess of permanent impairment, and the extent thereof; 
7. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-406 
is appropriate; and, 
8. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's unreasonable 
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
DATED in Boise, Idaho, thi~ fday of~/ , 2000. 
INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Referee 
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